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Abstract
Existing publish-subscribe systems focus on functionality and routing and
does not provide any guarantee in terms of security and fault tolerance. This
work extends a particular publish-subscribe system, REDS (REcongurable
Dispatching System), adding specific mechanisms to provide resilience. Se-
curity is provided through the concepts of secure path and access control.
Fault tolerance is guaranteed increasing the number of links connecting two
neighbors. Using these concepts, we illustrate the new architecture of REDS,
called SEC-REDS, in which we have added new components, like the Security
Manager and the Backup Connections Manager.
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Chapter 1
Publish-Subscribe systems
Ma sendo l’intento mio scrivere cosa utile a chi la
intende, mi e` parso piu` conveniente andare drieto
alla verita` effettuale della cosa che alla immagina-
zione di essa.
Niccolo’ Machiavelli (1469 - 1527)
Italian philosopher
1.1 Introduction
Publish-subscribe ( [1], [2], [3], [4]) (here after called pub-sub) is a commu-
nication paradigm that supports dynamic, many to many communications
in a distributed environment. It provides an asynchronous mechanism to
exchange messages between publishers (senders) and subscribers (receivers).
Subscribers express their interest in one or many classes of messages and
they receive only that belong to these classes, whitout knowing any thing
1
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about the senders originated them. This decoupling between publishers and
subscribers allows a great scalability and a more dynamic network topology.
Publishing a message is said event , while delivering it event notification.
This automatic delivery of messages is achieved through a third entity, called
Event Notication Service or Dispatching Network , which receives events pro-
ducted by the publishers and sends them to subscribers. The Event Notifica-
tion Service (ENS, for short) represents the middleware and has to provide
all the functions publishers and subscribers can use to subscribe, publish
or remove their messages. For instance, instead of requiring publishers to
identify destination addresses for their messages (potentially requiring mul-
tiple messages to multiple destinations), an ENS network can handle message
routing in a way that avoids unnecessary message replications.
This event-based mechanism allows a decoupling between publishers and
subscribers in the sense of:
• time decoupling: it is not necessary that both publishers and sub-
scribers are active at the same time;
• space decoupling: publishers do not know neither subscribers iden-
tity nor their number, and vice versa.
• synchronization decoupling: publishers can produce events without
waiting that someone receives them. Events are stored by the Event
Notification Service, which notifies them to subscribers, while they are
doing other operations.
Figure 1.1 shows a simple pub-sub system where subscribers S1, S2 and
S3 send subscriptions f1, f2 and f3 respectively to some hosts in the ENS
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Figure 1.1: A publish-subscribe system
network. Publisher P1 sends a datagram d to some entry point of the net-
work. Message d matches f1 and f2 but not f3 thus ENS sends d to S1 and
S2. Note that the publisher only sends d into the network once and need
know anything about the subscribers or subscription functions.
The earliest publish-subscribe systems used subject-based subscription (
[5]). In such systems, every message is labeled by the publisher as belonging
to one of a fixed set of subjects (also known as groups, channels, or topics).
Subscribers subscribe to all the messages within a particular subject or set
of subjects. A significant restriction with subject-based publish-subscribe is
that the selectivity of subscriptions is limited to the predefined subjects. An
emerging alternative to subject-based systems is content-based subscription
systems ( [6], [7], [8]). These systems support an event schema defining
the type of information contained in each event (message). With content-
based subscription, subscribers have the added flexibility of choosing filtering
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criteria along multiple dimensions, without requiring definition of subjects.
1.2 Pub-sub systems design space
Existing publish-subscribe middleware differs along several dimensions (
[9]):
• the format of messages: Messages can be untyped sequences of
values like tuples, or untyped, record-like, messages or sequences of
fields, each with a name and a value or, finally, typed objects;
• the expressivity of the subscription language (filters): The ex-
pressivity of the subscription language allows one to distinguish be-
tween Subject-based, in which the set of subjects is determined a priori
(e.g. give me all the temperature events), and Content-based, in which
subscriptions contain expressions (message filters) that allow clients to
filter messages based on their content (e.g.: give me only the tempera-
ture events greater than ten grades);
• the architecture of the dispatcher: it can be centralized or dis-
tributed. In the first case, a single component is in charge of collecting
subscriptions and forward messages to subscribers, while in the latter
one, a set of message brokers organized in an overlay network cooperate
to collect subscriptions and route messages. The topology of the over-
lay network and the routing strategy adopted may vary, but typically,
a tree overlay and subscription forwarding are used;
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• the routing strategy (in presence of a distributed dispatcher):
it can be based on message forwarding or subscription forwarding on
a tree. In the first case, every broker stores only subscriptions coming
from directly connected clients, messages are forwarded from broker to
broker and delivered to clients only if they are subscribed. In the second
case, every broker forwards subscriptions to the others, subscriptions
are never sent twice over the same link and messages follow the routes
laid by subscriptions;
• the forwarding strategy: when a subscriber subscribes to a partic-
ular message (called filter), the broker adds it into a table, the sub-
scription table. When that broker receives a message, it compares it
with all the filters contained in the subscription table to determine to
which subscribers the message must be delivered. The efficiency of
this process may vary, depending on the complexity of the subscription
language, but also on the forwarding algorithm chosen, which greatly
influences the overall performance of the system.
1.2.1 Content-based routing
Content-based routing (CBR, [10], [11]) differs from classical routing in
that messages are addressed based on their content instead of their desti-
nation. In conventional systems, the sender explicitly species the intended
message recipients using a unicast or multicast address. Instead, in CBR the
sender simply injects the message in the network, which determines how to
route it according to the nodes interests. They identify the relevant classes of
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messages based on their content, e.g., using key-value pairs or regular expres-
sions. Therefore, in CBR it is the receiver that determines message delivery,
not the sender.
Although it enables multi-point communication, CBR is not simply multi-
cast. In network-level (e.g., IP) or application-level (e.g., topic-based publish-
subscribe) multicast, the address of the multicast groups (or topics) used by
the application must be defined a priori and made globally known or avail-
able. Moreover, a client joined to a given group receives all the messages
addressed to that group, and only those. If the messages are to be received
from multiple groups, the client must join all of them. Indeed, messages are
conceptually partitioned in classes, and the binding between a message and
its class is established by the sender. In contrast, in CBR message consumers
define their own message classes; these select only the desired messages, need
not be known to other clients, and can be arbitrarily overlapping.
CBR fosters a form of implicit communication that breaks the coupling
between senders and receivers. Senders no longer need to determine the
address of communication parties. Similarly, receivers do not know who is
the sender of a message, unless this information is somehow encoded in the
message itself.
The sharp decoupling induced by this form of communication enables
one to easily add, remove, or change brokers or clients at run-time with little
impact on the overall architecture.
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1.3 State of the art
1.3.1 SIENA
SIENA (Scalable Internet Event Notification Architectures [12], [13], [14],
[15], [16]) is a research project which realizes a generic scalable pub-sub event
notification service. It’s based on the content based networking.
Given that the primary purpose of an event notification service is to
support notification selection and delivery, the challenge SIENA deals with
is maximizing expressiveness in the selection mechanism without sacrificing
scalability in the delivery mechanism. Expressiveness refers to the ability
of the Event Notification Service to provide a powerful data model with
which to capture information about events, to express filters and patterns
on notifications of interest, and to use that data model as the basis for
optimizing notification delivery, while scalability is the ability of the ENS
to accommodate any growth in the future, be it expected or not.
1.3.2 REDS
REDS (REconfigurable Dispatching System [17]) is a publish-subscribe
middleware designed to tolerate dynamic reconfigurations of the dispatching
infrastructure. Its highly modular design decouples the management of re-
configuration from the other issues, and in general empowers developers with
a high degree of flexibility. In fact REDS provides a modular architecture
whose components can be easily changed to adapt to different deployment
scenarios.
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It is organized as:
1. a collection of peers, called clients , which publish and subscribe mes-
sages,
2. the dispatcher , which is responsible for collecting subscriptions and
forwarding messages from publishers to subscribers. The dispatcher
is realized as a distributed set of brokers interconnected in a overlay
network, cooperatively routing the messages and subscriptions issued
by the clients connected to them.
REDS is a framework (in the object-oriented sense) of Java interfaces and
classes, which define:
1. a client API , enabling access to the publish-subscribe services;
2. A broker API , enabling access to the components inside the broker.
To support dynamic reconfiguration of the dispatching network, REDS
brokers are structured in two layers: Overlay and Routing , which are inde-
pendent.
The overlay layer is in charge of managing the topology of the overlay
dispatching network. It offers services to build the overlay network and
rearrange it based on input from upper layers.
The routing layer implements the main routing process by registering
with the overlay component to be notified when subscriptions, messages and
replies arrive from neighbors.
Hereafter REDS architecture is considered and extended. Why do we
have preferred REDS to other pub-sub systems?
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• Many scientific publications exist about REDS, that is REDS is object
of interest for many researchers.
• The software is publicly available.
• Its developers are Italian and one of them has been a project partner
of our Department.
1.4 Security issues and requirements for Pub-
sub systems
In a wide-area pub-sub network, the pub-sub service must handle informa-
tion dissemination across distinct authoritative domains, heterogeneous plat-
forms and a large, dynamic population of publishers and subscribers. Such
an environment raises serious security and trust concerns. This includes ac-
cess control to the pub-sub infrastructure (and the data it transports), as
well as the need to establish mutual trust between producers and consumers
of data.
The security requirements [18] [19] [20] for a pub-sub system can be di-
vided into the requirements for a particular application involving publishers
and subscribers, and the requirements for the pub-sub infra structure:
• The application, comprising the publishers and subscribers. Publish-
ers and subscribers may not trust each other, and may not trust the
pub-sub network.
• The infrastructure, consisting of the pub-sub network that provides
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services to the application. The infrastructure may not trust publishers
and subscribers. Components of the infrastructure may not necessarily
trust each other.
For example, providing a mechanism that defines who has what access
to what information is mostly an application-level concern. It requires a
definition of identity, authorization and access control within the pub-sub
infrastructure. In the meantime, controlling who is able to change the sub-
scription database maintained by the pub-sub service and restricting channel
utilization are infrastructure-level protection issues.
1.4.1 Generic issues
The most important security issues are:
1. Authentication: it establishes the identity of the originator of a mes-
sage. End-to-end authentication can be implemented outside of the
pub-sub domain. If a public key infrastructure exists independent of
the pub-sub network, end-to-end authentication can be accomplished
by having publishers sign messages using their private keys. The sub-
scribers can then verify a publishers identity by verifying the digital
signatures attached to the message. The signing and verification oper-
ations occur outside of the pub-sub domain, and they can be adminis-
tered independently.
2. Information integrity: it establishes that a message is not modified
by an unauthorized node (a client or a broker) during its delivery. The
standard means to provide information integrity is by using digital
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signatures. A digital signature, when signed on the message digest
with the senders private key, provides that the message content has
not been changed since it is signed, and the message indeed originated
from the sender. The provision of digital signatures can be largely
independent of the pub-sub infrastructure.
3. Subscription integrity: it establishes that a subscription is not mod-
ified by a broker, that is, if a client C subscribes to a message A, the
broker cannot change this subscription, for example specifying that C
subscribes to a message B. This is a traditional access-control issue that
can be solved with traditional means providing proper authentication
and rights management.
4. Service integrity: it guarantees that messages are delivered correctly
to right clients. A malicious broker could insert bogus subscriptions
and act as a bogus subscriber to neighboring brokers. Moreover, it can
ignore the routing algorithm entirely and route messages to arbitrary
destinations or drop them completely.
5. User anonymity: it specifies that the source of a message (a pub-
lisher or a subscriber) cannot be recognized through that message. A
publisher has to preserve his anonymity, without the Event Notifica-
tion Service or the subscribers can know who has originated that event.
Also a subscriber has to preserve his anonymity.
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1.4.2 Confidentiality
Pub-sub systems introduce three novel confidentiality issues :
• Information confidentiality. When information being published
contains sensitive content, publishers and subscribers may wish to keep
information secret from the pub-sub infrastructure. The requirement
of confidentiality against the infrastructure is in a fundamental conflict
with the pub-sub model. By definition, the pub-sub network routes in-
formation based on dynamic evaluations of information content against
user subscriptions. Keeping the information private from the routing
hosts may hinder such evaluations and hence routing.
• Subscription confidentiality. User subscriptions can reveal sensitive
information about the user, in which case the subscriber may wish to
keep the subscriptions private.
• Publications confidentiality. In some applications publications have
to be kept secret from those who are not legitimate subscribers. Pub-
lications confidentiality can be considered independent of the pub-sub
infrastructure. For example, the publisher can distribute a group key
to the subscribers using some out-of-band channel and encrypt the in-
formation content with the key. This ensures that only the subscribers
with the right key can read the message. The drawback of this scheme
is obvious: setting up a group key a priori, in essence, transforms the
communication model into a traditional multicast model, and therefore
minimizes the benefits of publish and subscribe. Alternatively, publish-
ers can trust the infrastructure to maintain publication confidentiality.
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Publishers send messages into the pub-sub system, which ensures that
only registered users receive them.
1.4.3 Availability
As in other communication systems, denial of service attacks remain as
a significant risk for pub-sub systems. In fact, malicious publications and
subscriptions can be used to overload the system. In the general case, denial
of service attacks are impossible to prevent. However, certain measure can be
taken to minimize the probability of a wide spread denial of service attack.
For example, a technique based on a limited number of publications by every
publisher can be adopted.
1.4.4 Trust
Trust in pub-sub systems cannot be associated with specific producers and
consumers, because one of the most important purposes of these systems is
decoupling the two parts. This imposes the question of how the mutual trust
between publishers and subscribers can be established. The obvious approach
is to delegate some of the aspects of trust interaction to the pub-sub service.
For instance, access control and secured delivery can be added to the pub-sub
infrastructure. Unfortunately, this often implies that the infrastructure as a
whole is trusted, and this is not the best solution to the problem. Another
approach could be to split up publishers and subscribers in groups of trust. In
this case, publishers belonging to a group have to trust only with subscribers
and publishers belonging to the same group and not with those belonging to
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Figure 1.2: An scope graph.
the other groups. This is achieved through scoping.
Let consider the example of Figure 1.2, where R,S,T and U represent bro-
kers, while X,Y and Z clients (in the figure a client is called simple com-
ponent). The arrows represent the visibility, i.e. R sees T and U but not
S, while T sees R and the clients Y and Z, and so on. Thus, a notification
published by Z is delivered to Y and to any other consumers in T and U if
their subscription matches. Also, it is visible in R if it matches the output
interface of T or U, but it is not visible in S.
To guarantee that only clients belonging to a scope can produce and read
messages from that scope, security services have to be implemented. These
services base on the concept of group, described later.
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Figure 1.3: A standard ENS.
1.5 Fault tolerance in publish-subscribe sys-
tems
In general, a publish-subscribe system, as a generic distributed system, is
not free of failures. In fact, hardware, software or all the dispatching network
could crash. If we consider a simple ENS, it does not provide any guarantee
in terms of fault tolerance. The fault tolerance is the capability of the system
to guarantee that operations (like messages delivery) will continue even in
the presence of faults.
Let consider the example of Figure 1.3. The ENS is made of the brokers
A,B,C,D,E,F and G, the publisher P and the subscriber S. Let suppose that
S subscribes to messages of the type published by P, so it will receive them.
In normal conditions, the delivering is correct, and the messages go from P
to S, passing through the path composed by D,B,A,C and G. But, if the link
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between A and C drops, no path can be established from P to S, so S won’t
receive the messages. This situation brings to catastrophic consequences
if P and S constitute a critic system. The previous example shows that
publish-subscribe systems should maintain availability even at low levels of
hardware/software/network reliability.
Fault tolerance, that should not involve users or system administrators,
is achieved by:
• data recovery : it is the process of recovering data from damaged, failed,
corrupted or inaccessible storage media. In order to provide data re-
covery, brokers should have a log file, in which they should store all the
operations they make. This log file should be stored on a persistent
storage media like a tape. Thus when a broker crashes, all its history
can be recovered from the log file.
• replication of brokers : each broker could have a twin so all the infor-
mation sent to it should be sent also to its twin. If it crashes, the twin
could replace it. The mechanism could be extended so a broker could
have many twins.
• replication of links : each broker is connected to its neighbors through
many links, so if one of them drops, traffic goes on the others.
The rest of the chapter focuses on the third possibility, that is the repli-
cation of links.
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1.5.1 Replication of links in a tree ENS
Let suppose that the ENS is composed by brokers sorted to form a tree
(see [21]), as the Figure 1.3 shows. If the link between two brokers drops,
the connectivity of the tree is compromised. However a publish-subscribe
system could offer a dynamic reconfiguration of the network (see [22], [23]),
that allows the dispatching network to reconfigure dynamically if a broker
departs from it. However, this mechanism does not resolve the problem,
if a link does not drop, but it is overloaded. In this case, the dynamic
reconfiguration of the network does not work, because no link drops.
To resolve the problem, that is to allow the dispatching system to work
even in the presence of overload, a new architecture could be provided. In
a standard tree every broker is connected to its sons and to its parent. The
new architecture extends the connectivity, so a broker can be connected also
to its brothers through a link of backup, as the Figure 1.4 shows. A broker
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Figure 1.5: A link failure. Although the link between A and C drops, the
message originated by P arrives to S.
sends messages that it receives both on the standard links (those connecting
it to its sons and its parent) and on the links of backup. The receiver broker
checks the received messages. If all those coming from the link of backup are
also received from a standard link,it drops them, so it sends to its neighbors
only the copy of the messages coming from the standard links. But, if there
a message, that is not received from a standard link, as the Figure 1.5 shows,
the broker can send to its neighbors that coming from the link of backup.
The link of backup has realized a form of redundancy.
1.5.2 A double link between brokers
The previous mechanism does not work when the topology of the ENS is
not a tree. To resolve the problem, a new architecture can be provided.
As the Figure 1.6 suggests, two brokers can be connected through two
connections, a normal one and a backup one. Normally, the traffic, wanting
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specific services (like security, a high throughput and so on) passes over the
high performance link, while the standard traffic goes on the other link. If the
low performance link drops, the service is not provided, because the traffic
on it is not necessary, but if the high performance link drops, the traffic on
it, is redirected over the link of low performance. However, if that traffic
needs security guarantees, also the link of low performance must offer them.
This can be achieved using standard techniques of confidentiality, integrity
and so on.
Chapter 2
Infrastructure security
Everything should made as simple as possible,but
not simpler.
Albert Einstein (1879 - 1955)
German physicist
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, two kinds of security have been presented: infras-
tructure and application. Hereafter infrastructure security is analyzed, that
is security for brokers network.
In general, the dispatching network is composed of brokers. In the basic
case (when there is no security), all these brokers trust each other. So a ma-
licious broker can join the network with the same rights of the other brokers.
Note that in this context the rights represent the capability of a broker to
inject into the network publications and subscriptions. This means that the
20
CHAPTER 2. INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 21
A B
P S
Figure 2.1: A dispatching network made of two brokers.
malicious broker can send to the others bogus publications/subscriptions. To
understand the seriousness of the problem, let consider an example. Let sup-
pose that the dispatching network is used as the infrastructure for a sensor
network that monitors the temperature of a wood, and let suppose that the
publishers are sensors of temperature, while there is only a subscriber, which
is a computer that elaborates the received data, calculating the average tem-
perature. If the temperature exceeds an established threshold, some counter
measure is taken. If a malicious broker joins the network, it can inject bogus
publications. So the subscriber receives those and could calculate a wrong
value. This example shows that the problem does not concern only the bro-
kers, but also the clients (a client is a publisher or a subscriber). In fact,
there is no need for an adversary to build up a malicious broker to join the
network and then inject wrong publications, because it can simply act as a
publisher of false publications, as there is no control on clients.
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The previous example shows the need of a secure architecture for the
dispatching network, that:
• allows a broker to authenticate its neighbors (that is, brokers or clients
directly connected with it),
• gives a subscriber the guarantee that it does not receive informations
coming from bogus publishers, and a publisher the guarantee that its
publications are not received also by malicious subscribers,
• gives a client the guarantee that the message delivery is secure, that is
messages are not read or modified by an adversary during the rounting
process.
In order to provide this mechanism, a generic publish-subscribe system
model must be extended with the concepts of:
• secure path, and
• access control.
2.2 Secure Path
In general a broker A (or a client) wanting to connect to another broker B
must know the URL of B. The broker A could establish a connection to B re-
lying on a standard protocol, like TCP or UDP. However, A could have more
complex needs, that is it could wish some guarantees in terms of security. In
this case A could establish a connection using a secure protocol like SSL. In
order to use the SSL protocol, A must present to B a certificate, that allows
CHAPTER 2. INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 23
it to authenticate itself to B. But also B must present a certificate to A, to
authenticate itself. This mechanism relies on the mutual authentication of A
and B.
The certificate sent from A to B and viceversa, is a standard certificate
(like a X509Certificate), signed by a Certification Authority , that is not fur-
ther specified in this context. It is made of all the informations used to
identify a broker, like the subject, the organization and so on.
However, the authentication provided by SSL is not sufficient to authen-
ticate a neighbor, in a publish-subscribe context. In fact, if the neighbor
presents a certificate, a specific protocol like SSL does not check the subject
of the certificate, it simply verifies whether it is valid or not. Instead, in
a dispatching network a more complex test could be needed. Let suppose
that a pub-sub system is used by a bank. An adversary could have a valid
certificate, signed by a generic CA, so it could join the bank and receive
all the information. This example shows that after having authenticated a
neighbor, a second phase is needed, that is authorization. Each broker can
store locally the list of only accepted certificates, that is an access control
list . So although an adversary has a certificate, certainly it is not stored
by the brokers of the bank, and it will not be accepted as trusted neighbor.
However, if a broker does not contain a certificate in its local list, it may ask
the dispatching network whether they have it. This procedure is described
later.
Summarizing, a broker could wish to establish a connection with another
broker, having some guarantees in terms of security. A such connection is
called secure connection. In order to establish a secure connection, both the
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Figure 2.2: How a secure connection is established.
neighbors must pass two phases:
• Authentication, in which each neighbor provides to the other a certifi-
cate, signed by a generic CA. This certificate is analyzed by the receiver,
which checks whether the certificate is valid or not, expired or not. If
the certificate is valid and not expired, it is further analyzed in the
second phase.
• Authorization, in which the broker checks whether the previous cer-
tificate is contained in the local access control list of certificates. If
this phase is passed a secure connection is established between the two
peers. However, if this phase is not passed a specific strategy can be
adopted, specified by the connection policy , described later.
The Figure 2.2 shows what happens when a secure connection is opened.
Firstly there is the negoziation of the link (e.g. SSL) parameters; then the
authentication phase begins through the certificates. Each peer authenticates
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itself sending its certificate to the other. If this phase is successful, each peer
(only if it is a broker, a client does not further check the certificate) checks
if its local access control list of certificates contains the received one. If the
list of each neighbor contains the received certificate, the neighbor passes the
authorization phase, and a secure connection is established between the two
peers.
The concept of secure connection suggests the division of brokers and
clients in trusted and untrusted. . Conceptually, a broker considers trusted
another broker if it can assume that the informations received from that
neighbor are not bogus. In practice, a broker (or client) is considered trusted
by another broker if it is connected to it through a secure connection (like
SSL), while it is considered untrusted if it is connected through a standard
connection (like TCP or UDP).
Using the concept of trusted neighbor, we can give a new definition of
secure connection. A connection is considered secure if all the messages pass-
ing on it cannot be read or modified by an unauthorized source, that is a
node (a client or a broker) different from the two directly connected by that
link. In our context, a secure connection is established between two brokers
trusting each other. So a message passing on a secure connection cannot be
read or modified by an unauthorized source. A chain of secure connections
going from a publisher to a subscriber constitues a secure path. Let con-
sider the example of Figure 2.3. The secure links between two neighbors are
trusted, so a path exists from the subscriber to the publisher. This path is
secure, because it is made by a chain of secure connections. In this case, the
publisher has the guarantee that an untrusted third part cannot receive its
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Figure 2.3: A secure-path example.
publications. At the same time, the subscriber knows that the publications
it receives do not come from an untrusted publisher.
2.3 Group
In this paragraph we introduce the concept of group. Let consider the
example of Figure 2.4. If the broker A trusts the broker B and the broker C,
but not E, and if B and C trust D, and D trusts B and C but not F, a group
made of A,B,C,D is built up.
Thus, a group is a collection of trusted brokers, in which every member of
the group can reach the other members through a secure path. The concept
of group is linked to that of scoping . Scoping implies that a broker is not
able to see all the network, but it has a partial view of it. Let consider again
the Figure 2.4. The broker E does not know that beyond A there are B,C
and D, in the sense that if a publisher attached to E publishes a message,
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Figure 2.4: A group example: the cloud shows a group, made by A,B,C and
D. The links beteween A and E, and D and F are untrusted.
D
B
A
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E
GF
H
Figure 2.5: Isolated groups. A,B,C and D constitute a group and E,F and
G form another group. The two groups communicate through the broker
H, which is considered untrusted by both C and F so the two groups can’t
exchange secure informations.
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Figure 2.6: Hospital reparts. Conceptually the three reparts are independent
each other. However, general informations, that is untrusted informations are
delivered to all of them.
secure subscribers attached to A,B,C and D do not receive it. Note that
a client is secure if it is connected to the broker with a secure connection.
Only subscribers attached to F or unsecure ones attached to A,B,C or D can
read the message. This suggests that many isolated groups may exist, as the
Figure 2.5 shows.
The presence of many groups can be an advantage or a disadvantage,
according to the points of view. Many separated groups are useful when the
network is divided into areas, like reparts of an hospital, in which the general
information must be received by all the subscribers, while particular ones
must be received only by a repart rather than another. This is shown in
Figure 2.6. However, the presence of many isolated group could constitute
also a problem. A trusted subscriber belonging to a group will not receive
informations coming from a publisher belonging to another group. This could
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Figure 2.7: A mobile subscriber. The subscriber firstly attaches to group A,
and secondly to group B.
seem right, but it is not. In fact, let consider the example of Figure 2.7. If a
mobile subscriber attaches firstly to a broker belonging to the group A, it will
receive informations from the publisher P, which belongs to the same group
(here we are talking about secure clients), but if it latter moves and attaches
to a broker belonging to the group B, it will not receive informations coming
from P.
2.4 Certificate request
Let suppose that a client C wants to connect to a broker B through a
secure connection. So it must present a Certificate. Let further suppose that
the access control list of certificates of B does not contain that presented by
C. In this case, B may simply refuse the connection request. However, it may
ask the trusted brokers if someone in its local access control list of certificates
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Figure 2.8: Certificate request flooding
contains that certificate. In this case B may accept the connection request of
C. In order to provide this mechanism, when a broker receives a certificate
that it does not know, it sends a CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, containing that
certificate, to its trusted neighbors (only if they are brokers). When a neigh-
bor receives a such message, it checks whether it contains that certificate in
its local list. If the answer is positive, it builds a CERTIFICATE_REPLY to
the sender, which can accept the certificate as trusted and so the connec-
tion request. However,if a neighbor does not know that certificate, it sends
a CERTIFICATE_REQUEST to its trusted neighbors, except that from which
it has received the request. In order to avoid loops, if a neighbor receives
twice or many times the same request it drops it and does not send it to its
neighbors. The Figure 2.8 shows a certificate request flooding.
The broker A sends the request to B and C. B sends it to C and D, but
C drops it because it has already received the request from A. C sends the
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request to B and E, but B drops it and so on until the request arrives to F.
Let suppose that the broker F of the previous figure knows the certificate, so
it sends a CERTIFICATE_REPLY to the neighbor from which it has received the
message. In order to send the message to A, the reply must contain the chain
of brokers from F to A. To explain this, let consider the example shown in
the Figure 2.9, in which the brokers A,B,C and D are shown. When a broker
sends a CERTIFICATE_REQUEST to its neighbors, it adds its node id to it (this
operation is called push). So when the request arrives to the last broker, it
contains the chain of brokers from A to D. A broker can establish to which
neighbor it must send the CERTIFICATE_REPLY, making a pop in the stack of
node id contained in the message. Obviously, also the CERTIFICATE_REPLY
must contain that stack. If the source of the CERTIFICATE_REQUEST (i.e. A in
the example) does not receive any answer in a time at least equal to the RTT
of the network, it considers the certificate untrusted, so it can simply apply
the specific connection policy, described later to the new neighbor (that is,
the neighbor asking for the connection).
2.4.1 Managing untrusted connections
In the previous paragraphs, we have said that if a broker wants to open a
secure connection towards another broker, it must pass both the authentica-
tion test and the authorization test. But, what happens if a neighbor does
not pass at least one of those tests? In this case, the connection cannot be
secure, so the neighbor cannot be considered trusted.
In order to manage those situations, each broker maintains a local policy,
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Figure 2.9: Certificate reply forwarding.
called connection policy, which establishes what must be done when a neigh-
bor does not pass the authentication test or the authorization test or both of
them. Many connection policies could be adopted. For example, the broker
could simply refuse the connection (so the connection is closed) or it could
accept that connection as untrusted.
2.5 Access Control
In the previous paragraphs, we have analyzed the concept of secure path,
which has allowed us the division between trusted and untrusted neighbors.
In this paragraph we consider trusted neighbors so the access control refers
only to the trusted part of the dispatching network. In particular, messages
coming from a trusted client (that is a trusted publisher or subscriber) can
submitted to access control : each broker stores an access control policy so
when it receives a message, it checks whether that message is consistent
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Figure 2.10: An example of bogus subscriber.
with its access rights. Only in this case, the client is allowed to publish or
subscribe to that message.
Conceptually, a client wanting to connect to a broker must send it a tuple
(S,A,R), in which it specifies that the subject S wants to perform the action
A on the resource R. In particular, the subject is the same client, the action
is publish or subscribe and the resource is the type of message. The broker
compares the received tuple (S,A,R) with its local access control policy and
if there is a match, the client is allowed to perform the asked operation on
the asked resource.
However a problem arises. Let consider the example of Figure 2.10, where
two subscribers and a publisher are showed. Let suppose that the local policy
of the broker specifies that ”only the subscriber A can receive the publications
of P”. So when A subscribes, it sends to the broker the tuple (A, subscribe,
Messages of P) and then it will receive the messages. The subscriber B,
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Figure 2.11: Broker A stores a table of connections, in which it stores for
each connection the node id of the neighbor, and a table of access rights, in
which for each client it stores its access rights.
also connected through a secure connection, subscribes sending the tuple (B,
subscribe, Messages of P) so it will not receive any message. But if B is a
malicious subscriber, it can send a bogus tuple (A, subscribe, Messages of
P), as there is no control that the three elements of the tuple are true.
To resolve this problem, different strategies can be adopted. A simple
solution is shown in the Figure 2.11: each node (that is a broker or a client)
is characterized by a node id, that is unique in the whole network. For every
connection each broker stores the node id of the neighbor so when it receives
a message it is able to determine the node id of the sender of that message.
Furthermore, the broker stores in a table for each node id which are the
access rights, so when it receives a message, the broker determines the node
id of the sender and checks if the tuple (S,R,A) contained in the message
is substantial with the access rights stored in the table for that node id. If
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Figure 2.12: Message format.
the test is positive, the client is allowed to perform the asked operations.
However, this solution supposes that the broker knows the access rights of
all clients.
As alternative, we can introduce the concept of Authorizations Certificate.
When a client wants to perform an action on a resource, it must present an
Authorizations Certificate, signed by a Certification Authority not specified
in this context. The Authorizations Certificate authorizes a subject to per-
form an action on a resource. Thus the Authorizations Certificate gives the
client some particular access rights. In particular, the format of the message
sent by the client is shown in the Figure 2.12. The message is composed of
two parts, the Authorizations Certificate and the tuple (S,R,A), that speci-
fies the asked operation. The Authorizations Certificate contains the public
key of the sender and its access rights and it is signed by a generic CA. Op-
tionally, it can also contain a content, described later. The tuple (S,R,A)
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contained in the message is signed with the private key of the sender, whose
corresponding public key is contained in the Authorizations Certificte. So
a binding is created between the Authorizations Certificate and the asked
operations. When a broker receives a such message, it controls that the
Authorizations Certificate is valid, then it takes the public key from that
certificate and uses it to decript the tuple (S,R,A) contained in the same
message. Then the broker checks that the asked operations contained in the
tuple are substantial with those specified in the Authorizations Certificate.
If all these tests are passed, the broker accepts the subscription/publication
contained in the message.
Summarizing, access control is achieved through two mechanisms:
• the local policy, stored by each broker, and
• the Authorizations Certificate, contained in the message sent by the
client.
When a broker receives a message containing the Authorizations Certificate
it calculates the logic and between the local policy and the policy specified in
the Authorizations Certificate. The result gives the access rights of the client.
In order to understand the mechanism, let consider the following example.
Let suppose that the local policy of a broker is made of two rules:
• allow all the clients to subscribe to a message of type XXXX,
• deny all publishers to publish messages of type YYYY.
Let further suppose that a subscriber wants to send a subscription to the
previous broker and its Authorizations Certificate is: Allow this client to
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subscribe to messages of type XXXX. In this case, when the broker receives a
such message, it checks the policy contained in the Authorizations Certificate
and compares it with its local policy, making a logic and . In the example
the broker calculates the logic and between allow all the clients to subscribe
to a message of type XXXX (given by its local policy) and Allow this client
to subscribe to messages of type XXXX (given by the Authorizations Certifi-
cate). The result, obviously, is Allow this client to subscribe to messages of
type XXXX.
Furthermore, the mechanism of access control can be extendend. Infact,
a publisher can send to the broker a message with new rules, in which it
specifies which subscribers can receive that message. The broker adds these
rules into its policy and floods them to its secure neighbors, that update their
policy and flood them to their neighbors and so on. These rules are combined
with the existing ones according to the specific combining algorithm specified
by the local policy configuration file.
Let consider the example of Figure 2.13. Let suppose that the brokers of
the network are all trusted. The publisher publishes a message with a new
rule. The broker directly connected to it, receives the message and update
its local policy. Then it sends an message of update to its secure neighbors
(brokers). These brokers update their policy with the new rule and then
forward the message to their secure neighbors, which finally update their
policy. So the network is updated.
If a new trusted broker attaches to the dispatching network, the directly
connected trusted broker floods to it all the new rules so it can update its
policy. The introduction of this mechanism makes the system very flexible.
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Figure 2.13: Rules flooding example
Let suppose that a subscriber tries to subscribe to a message of type A and let
suppose that the dispatching network has no rule that allows that subscriber
to subscribe. In this case, the subscriber request is moved into a temporary
queue. When a publisher sends to the network a rule that allows all clients
to access to the message of type A, that subscriber is removed from that
temporary queue and is allowed to perform the asked operation.
2.5.1 Message content
As already said, optionally a message can have a content, that is not
signed with the private key whose corresponding public key is contained in
the Authorizations Certificate. In particular, only publications can have a
content. The tuple (S,R,A) specifies the subject, the resource and the action
corresponding to that publisher and in particular the resource represents only
the heading of the publication. For example, the resource of a publication
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Figure 2.14: A teacher-students pub-sub system.
may be the temperature, and the content the effective value of it. So the
resource contained in the tuple (S,R,A) is used only to identify the topic of
the message, and the content represents the effective value of that topic. Here
a problem arises. Given a set of subscribers with different access rights and
needs and a publisher which publishes messages with content, we want to
develop the following strategy: each subscriber receives only the part of that
publication which it can receive, that is to which it has access rights. This
mechanism corresponds to associate to a message content different views.
In general, the content of a message can be composed of many parts, and
a publisher can specify which category of subscribers can read each part. Let
consider the example of Figure 2.14. Let suppose that a teacher (publisher)
publishes messages about phylosophy to his students (subscribers) and let
suppose that students are divided in three categories ( I, II and III). Let fur-
ther suppose that students receive informations about phylosophy according
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Figure 2.15: The message composed by the teacher.
to which category they belong. The teacher composes a message (shown in
the Figure 2.15), in which the subject is himself, the action is publish and
the resource (the topic of the message) is phylosophy. He also specifies the
content of the message, and its visibility rules. Students belonging to the
first category can see only information about Socrates, those belonging to
the second category both information about Socrates and Immanuel Kant,
those belonging to the third category all information. In order to provide
this mechanism, the message contains a table of visibility, in which for each
category, its visibility is specified.
When a broker receives a such message, it firstly analyzes if the tuple
(S,R,A) matches that specified in the Authorizations Certificate. Then the
broker delivers it to subscribers having access rights to that message (that
is, subscribers allowed to read phylosophy messages). The Figure 2.16 shows
the message delivering. Note that the last broker of the chain removes all
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Figure 2.16: Message delivering. The student I (belonging to first category)
will receive only information about Socrates.
the additional information (like the Authorizations Certificate, the table of
visibility and the parts of the content for which the client has not access
rights) carried out by the message, and sends to the client only those of
interest.
2.6 REDS extensions
The standard REDS broker architecture does not provide any strategy to
establish a secure path and access control. So we have extended this basic
architecture to allow security guarantees.
In the new architecture of REDS, all the security aspects are managed by
a new component, the Security Manager . Note that a component is a software
object that is in charge of something and interacts with other components.
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Figure 2.17: The standard REDS architecture. The Router is made of two
sub-components, the Routing Strategy and the Reply Manager, while the
Overlay is made of the Transport and the Topology Manager.
2.6.1 The Security Manager
The standard broker architecture is made by two components: the Over-
lay, and the Router (see Figure 2.17 for details). The former manages the
topology of the dispatching network, while the latter provides a mechanism
for the delivering of the messages. This basic architecture has been extended.
In the new architecture another component is added, the Security Man-
ager, which is also the central component of this new architecture. It is in
charge of security aspects, but in general it does not affect the Router and
the Overlay components. Infact it is not a new layer in the REDS broker
architecture, it is simply a new component so also in the new architecture the
two old layers, the routing and the overlay, are mantained. The relationship
among these components is shown in the Figure 2.18. The Security Man-
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Figure 2.18: The OSI stack. The Security Manager, as the Routing and the
Overlay, works at the application layer.
ager, as the other two components (i.e. the Router and the Overlay), works
at the application layer of the OSI stack. It’s consulted by the Overlay or
by the Router, according to the specific operation. For example, the Trans-
port, which is a sub-component of the Overlay, asks the Security Manager
to check whether a neighbor can be accepted as trusted or not. This means
that the Security Manager maintains the local policy for trustworthyness.
Furthermore, the Routing Strategy, which is a sub-component of the Router,
consults the Security Manager to know if a message can be delivered to a
particular subscriber. This means that the Security Manager maintains also
the local policy for access control.
Summarizing, when a broker B1 tries to open a new connection with a
broker B2, it must pass two tests to become an effective neighbor of B2:
• the topology test, and
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Figure 2.19: The Security Manager sub-components.
• the security test.
The topology test is mandatory and is made by the Topology Manager,
a component provided by the basic REDS architecture. The security test is
mandatory only if a neighbor wants to open a secure connection and estab-
lishes whether a neighbor can be considered trusted or not and in this last
case what strategy must be applied.
As the Security Manager is in charge of many tasks, it is logic to di-
vide it in many sub-components. Note that a sub-component is a software
object that performs an action or many actions and interacts with other
sub-components, but it cannot interact with a component. In practice, a
component can be made of sub-components, but it is not necessary. As the
Figure 2.19 shows, the Security Manager if made of the following components:
• the Trust and the Connection Policy, linked to the concept of secure
path, and
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• the Access Control Strategy, linked to the concept of access control.
2.6.2 Trust
The Trust component is in charge of maintening the access control list of
certificates. In particular, it specifies the type of this access control list.
In the actual version of SEC-REDS two types of access control list of
certificates have been implemented:
• the Subject Based Trust, in which the access control list of certificates
stores only subjects of certificates. In this case, there is a match between
the certificate received from the neighbor and the local access control
list if there is a match between the subject of the received certificate and
one of the subjects stored in the local access control list of certificates.
• the Certificate Based Trust, in which the access control list of certifi-
cates stores certificates. In this case, there is a match between the
certificate received from the neighbor and the local access control list
if there is a match between the received certificate and one of the cer-
tificates stored in the local access control list of certificates.
2.6.3 Connection Policy
The Connection Policy component, as its name suggests, is in charge of
managing the connection policy, stored in the broker.
In the actual version of SEC-REDS two types of connection policy have
been implemented:
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• the Brutal Close Connection Policy, in which a connection is closed if
at least one between the authentication test and the authorizations test
is not passed.
• the Untrusted Degrade Connection Policy, in which a connection is
degraded to untrusted if at least one between the authentication test
and the authorizations test is not passed.
2.6.4 Access Control Strategy
To manage the access control, the Security Manager delegates to a new
sub-component this task. The sub-component is the Access Control Strat-
egy. In order to provide access control, the Access Control Strategy employs
XACML, so the architecture of a broker has been extended with the elements
to support XACML (e.g. the PDP), as the Figure 2.20 shows. In particular,
the broker stores the policy into a configuration file (e.g. policy.xml). The
XACML system receives as input a tuple composed by a subject S, an action
A and a resource R. This tuple specifies that the subject S wants to perform
the action A on the resource R. The XACML system asks the PDP (Policy
Decision Point), if that subject can perform that action on that resource,
and communicates the answer to the Access Control Strategy, which makes
something, according to the local strategy.
In order to provide access control at the second level (that is, a message
sent by a client contains its access rights through an Authorizations Certifi-
cate), a client can compose special messages, the XACML Messageswhich
contain the Authorizations Certificate.
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Figure 2.20: The Access Control Strategy.
2.7 Security issues provided by SEC-REDS
In the previous chapter a set of security issues for pub-sub systems has been
analyzed. Here after we specify which of them are satisfied by SEC-REDS.
• Authentication. A client can authenticate the broker and viceversa to
which it is attached through the certificate provided by it during the
negotiation of parameters. Also two brokers directly connected can
authenticate each other using a such certificate. But the authentica-
tion property is stronger; in fact, it allows a client to authenticate the
identity of the originator of a message, that is for a subscriber to au-
thenticate publishers. This can be achieved considering the concept of
secure path. A secure path is made of secure connections, each of them
has been established authenticating the neighbors. Thus, as the mes-
sage comes from a secure path, a subscriber can consider the originator
of the message (that is a publisher) as reliable.
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• Information integrity . This property is again provided by concept of
the secure connection, established between two peers. In fact, it guar-
antees that messages passing on it are not modified by an unauthorized
source (i.e. SSL provides it). As a subscriber and a publisher are con-
nected through a secure path and as a secure path is made of a chain
of secure connections, that separately provide information integrity, we
can conclude that this property is satisfied.
• Service integrity. Every broker is classified as trusted or not. An un-
trusted broker can’t access to or insert trusted informations, so the
service integrity is guaranteed.
• Information confidentiality . This property is again provided by the con-
cept of the secure connection, established between two peers. In fact, it
guarantees that messages passing on it are not read by an unauthorized
source (i.e. SSL provides it). As a subscriber and a publisher are con-
nected through a secure path and as a secure path is made of a chain
of secure connections, that separately provide information integrity, we
can conclude that this property is satisfied.
• Subscription/Publication confidentiality. If the publisher/subscriber is
trusted, untrusted neighbors don’t know that it exists, because neighter
trusted subscribers receive untrusted informations nor trusted publica-
tions are delivered to untrusted subscribers.
• User anonimity. It is not provided.
• Availability. It is not provided. In fact, Denial of Service may occur.
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Note that all these security aspects are been analyzed considering the dis-
patching network as trusted. If this hypotesis is not applicable, the previous
analysis is not valid.
Chapter 3
Network redundancy
Quicquid praecipies, esto breuis, ut cito dicta perci-
piant animi dociles teneantque fideles. Omne supe-
ruacuum pleno de pectore manat.
Qualunque cosa tu ti proponga di insegnare sii breve,
per modo che la mente apprenda subito senza fatica
e ritenga fedelmente cio` che hai detto: tutto il super-
fluo trabocca dall’animo pieno.
Quintus Horatii Flacci (65 a.C. - 8 a.C)
Latin poet
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we have analyzed security aspects, in terms of
confidentiality, integrity and access control. In this chapter we will develop a
strategy to build a robust pub-sub system, that is a tolerant failure system.
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B1 B2Internet
DEFAULT CONNECTION
Satellite
Figure 3.1: A backup connection example. The two brokers are connected
with a standard connection (Internet) and a backup connection (through
satellite).
A broker (or a client) may connect to another broker through many con-
nections. In this case, one of them is considered of default, the others of
backup, as shown in Figure 3.1.
Usually traffic is delivered using the default connection, but if something
happens on it (e.g. interrupted, closed, overloaded connection) traffic goes on
the first backup available connection. In order to provide this mechanism,
many strategies can be adopted. A simple strategy consists in setting up
many connections (all active), of which one is considered of default, the
others of backup. This simply mechanism, however, wastes a lot of resources
to mantain active many connections (e.g. in terms of bandwidth). In contrast
this strategy is very simple, because when the default connection drops, one
among the backup connections is elected as default. However this strategy
is very simple, so a more complex mechanism must be developed.
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Default Connection Internet
Backup Connection Satellite
Number of
tentatives
4
Timeout  3 sec.
CONFIGURATION FILE
Figure 3.2: A backup configuration file (backup strategy).
In general a connection (default or backup) is established between two
peers (neighbors), in particular one of them asks for the connection (i.e. tries
to open the connection invoking the method open()) and the other listens
to. The former is called master , the latter slave. This mechanism is implicit
in REDS. Furthermore it is the master that establishes whether it must
open a backup connection or not and specifies which actions the slave must
perform in order to set up a such connection. In order to do it, the master
must have a configuration file, that specifies which actions it must perform.
Let consider again the Figure 3.1. Let suppose that B1 is the master and
B2 the slave. Let further suppose that B1 has a configuration file (shown
in Figure 3.2), in which it is specified that normally the two brokers are
connected through the Internet connection, but if this drops, four tentatives
are made to restore it. If all these tentatives fail, B1 tries to open a backup
connection, using the satellite. Periodically, it checks whether the default
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connection is restored. If the answer is affirmative, the backup connection is
closed (as it is more expensive), and traffic goes on the default connection.
As the example suggests, the two brokers have different importance, in fact
the master decides what must be done and informs the slave of that.
3.2 SEC-REDS extensions
In order to provide fault tolerance, that is based on backup connections
between two brokers, another component is added to the REDS architecture,
that is the Backup Connections Manager , which works at the transport layer
(as shown in Figure 3.3), manages all the connections of backup and notifies
the transports if something happens (e.g. passing from a SSL connection to
a TCP connection). Note that as the Backup Connections Manager works at
the transport layer, the upper layers are not aware of the existence of backup
connections. Furthermore they are not informed if traffic goes on a default
connection or on a backup one.
The actual version of SEC-REDS provides two strategies to manage
backup connections:
• the Active Backup Connections, and
• the On Demand Backup Connections.
3.2.1 The Active Backup Connections
In this simple strategy the Backup Connections Manager mantains for
each neighbor the list of all the available connections. Among those, one
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Routing layer
Topology Manager
Backup Connections Manager
Transport
Figure 3.3: SEC-REDS architecture. Between the Transport and the Topol-
ogy Manager a new component is added, the Backup Connections Manager.
is of default and the others are of backup, as shown if Figure 3.5. All the
connections are active, in the sense that they waste resources, but only one
(that of default) is used to deliver messages. In particular, each connection
is identified by a connection ID, which must be unique for a neighbor, but
in general it is unique in the whole ENS. So each neighbor (identified by
a neighbor id) can set up many connections, each of them identified by a
connection id. A neighbor id is unique in the whole network, but also a
connection id is unique in the whole network.
A neighbor (master) can open a connection towards another neighbor
(slave) invoking the method openLink(String url), in which it specifies
the url of the slave. The first connection opened is considered of default.
If that method is invoked again on the same url, a backup connection is
created. If that method is invoked many times, many backup connections
are opened. The Figure 3.4 shows the effect of invoking many times the
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MASTER SLAVE
openLink(url) – connection 2
CONFIRM_OPEN
CONFIRM_OPEN
CONFIRM_OPEN
Neighbor Set
MASTER 
connection 1
openLink(url) – connection 1
openLink(url) – connection 3
Backup 
Neighbor Set
MASTER 
connection 2
Backup 
Neighbor Set
MASTER 
connection 2
connection 3
Neighbor Set
SLAVE
connection 1
Backup 
Neighbor Set
SLAVE 
connection 2
Backup 
Neighbor Set
SLAVE
connection 2
connection 3
Figure 3.4: The effect of calling many times the method openLink(url) on
the same url. After the first call, both the master and the slave add the
neighbor in the neighbor set (which mantains the list of all neighbors). After
the other calls, both the master and the slave add the neighbor in the list of
backup neighbor set (which mantains the list of all backup connections).
method openLink(String url). If the default connection drops, one of the
backup connections (i.e. usually the first available) is elected new default
connection, so traffic goes on it. If the old default connection is restored, it
is added as backup connection.
A broker may wish to change its default connection towards another bro-
ker. In this case, the previous mechanism must be extended. Let consider
the example shown in the Figure 3.6. The broker B1 is connected to B2
through three connections, A (default), B and C (backup). Let suppose that
B1 wants to set the default connection to C. In order to perform a such ac-
tion, it must inform B2 so also B2 can set the default connection to C. As
shown in the Figure 3.7, B1 sends a messsage to B2, containing the request
to change the default connection. Note that this message is delivered using
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B1 B2
B3
A default connection
B backup connection
C backup connection
D default connection
Neighbor B2
Connection Type
A default
B backup
C backup
Neighbor B3
Connection Type
D default
Figure 3.5: The tables show the lists of connections of broker B1. B1 is con-
nected to B2 through the default connection A and the backup connections
B and C. Furthermore, it is connected to B3 through the default connection
D.
B1 B2
A DEFAULT
B BACKUP
C BACKUP
Connection type
A Default
B Backup
C Backup
Figure 3.6: The two brokers are connected through three connections, A
(default), B and C (backup).
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Broker B1 Broker B2
SET_DEFAULT_CONNECTION
CONFIRM_DEFAULT_CONNECTION
Figure 3.7: In order to change the default connection, B1 sends to B2 a
message, set default connection, in which it specifies which connection must
become the new default connection. B2 replies with a confirm default con-
nection message.
the old default connection (A). When B2 receives a such message, it checks
whether it can accept C as new default connection or not. If the answer
if affirmative, it sends B1 another message (a confirm default connection).
Eventually, C becomes the new default connection.
In order to set a default connection, a broker must invoke the method
setDefaultConnection(neighborID,connectionID), in which it specifies
the neighbor id and the new default connection (identified by an id). The
effect of this call is to change the default connection for the neighbor identified
by the neighborID to that specified by the connectionID.
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MASTER SLAVE
Backup Strategy
openLink(defaultURL)
openLink(defaultURL)
openLink(defaultURL)
openLink(defaultURL)
openLink(defaultURL)
openLink(backupURL)
openLink(defaultURL)
CONFIRM_OPEN
CONFIRM_OPEN
CONFIRM_OPEN
LINK DEAD
timeout
Remove
the backup 
connection
Remove
the backup 
connection
Figure 3.8: The On Demand Backup Connections mechanism.
3.2.2 The On Demand Backup Connections
The mechanism described in the previous paragraph is very simple. In
particular, it does not work well when a system has not many resource.
Let consider a sensor pub-sub system, in which each broker is a sensor. Let
suppose that this system is used to measure glaciers temperature. Let further
suppose that each sensor is put in a glacier. In general a sensor has limited
resources (i.e. battery) so the previous strategy (many active connections,
of which only one is of default) is not the best solution, as sensors cannot
be removed from their place when their batteries die. Resources will have to
last any more.
In order to satisfy a such need, another strategy is adopted, that is the
On Demand Backup Connections. The previous mechanism (Active Backup
Connections) is weakly asymmetric, as the master and the slave execute the
same actions (however the master opens the connection). The new mecha-
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nism (On Demand Backup Connections) is strongly asymmetric, as the mas-
ter and the slave execute different actions. The master mantains a backup
strategy (that is a configuration file, like that shown in the Figure 3.2), in
which its backup policy is specified. Note that the slave has not a backup
strategy. To explain the mechanisms, let consider the Figure 3.8. The master
tries to open the default connection towards the slave, invoking the method
openLink(defaultUrl), the slave receives a such request and accepts it. As
effect, the two neighbors are linked. If the connection drops, the slave simply
notes it and closes the connection. In contrast, the master takes from the
backup strategy what it must do. Let suppose that the backup strategy is
that shown in the Figure 3.2. So it tries to restore the default connection.
If this tentative is successful, the master does not execute other actions, but
if it fails, the master retries for other three times. If all those tentatives fail,
the master tries to open a backup connection (the satellite of the figure),
invoking the method openLink(backupUrl). Let suppose that this tentative
is successful. In this case a new connection is established. Note that the slave
is not aware of the strategy adopted by the master. It is also not aware that
the new established connection is a backup connection. When the backup
connection is established, the master starts a timer. When the timeout goes
off, the master tries to restore the default connection. If this tentative fails,
it starts a new timer, when the timeout goes off, it retries to restore the
default connection and so on. If the tentative is successful, the master closes
the backup connection. When the slave accepts a new connection from the
same neighbor, it closes the old, as it was of backup, and sets up the new (the
default). The effect is that master and slave are linked through the default
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MASTER SLAVE
openLink(defaultURL)
setDefaultConnection(newDefaultURL)
CLOSE  DEFAULT URLCLOSE  DEFAULT URL
Figure 3.9: Changing a default connection using the On Demand Backup
Connections mechanism.
connection.
As the Active Backup Connections mechanism, also the On Demand
Backup Connections one allows a neighbor to change its default connec-
tion towards another neighbor. This can be achieved invoking the method
setDefaultConnection(newDefaultURL). The mechanism is showed in the
Figure 3.9. Firstly the master opens a default connection towards the slave,
invoking the method openLink(defaultURL). A connection is established
between the two peers. If the master wants to change its default connection,
it invokes the method setDefaultConnection(newDefaultURL), specifying
the new default URL. As effect of this call, both the master and the slave
close the old default connection, and they remain linked through the new
default connection.
Chapter 4
SEC-REDS implementation
Tutte le cose nel loro complesso sono migliori delle
superiori prese da sole.
Sant’Agostino (354-430)
Christian philosopher
4.1 Introduction
As said in the previous chapter the standard REDS architecture has been
extendend. The standard REDS provides a generic implementation of the
routing and overlay layers (called GenericRouter and GenericOverlay, re-
spectively), which don’t consider the security aspects. So, the first step
towards a security architecture is to extend this basic service, with a Secure
Router and a Secure Overlay. This is shown respectively in the Figures 4.3
and 4.4.
The pink components (the term component refers, as already said, to
a software object that is in charge of something and interacts with other
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components. It can be made of sub-components) shown in the figures are
not provided with the basic REDS architecture and are been implemented
in its extension. The figures don’t show the sub-components of each layer
(like the TopologyManager or theRoutingStrategy), but, obviously, also those
are been extended in the new architecture to support security. The only
component described in the next lines is the Transport , because it is more
complex than the others.
The Transport components provided with REDS are the UDP and TCP.
In the new architecture a SecureTransport is added, as shown in the Figure
4.5. A particular implementation of the SecureTransport is also provided,
that is the SSLTransport, which gives the clients many security guarantees,
like integrity and confidentiality of information. In order to provide both
standard and secure connections, another component is added, the Com-
plexTransport, that manages them. So a secure broker must implement a
ComplexTranport object in order to provide both standard and secure con-
nections.
Also the client API has been extended to support security. In the specific
case (as illustrated in the Figure 4.6), the DispatchingService interface has
been extended with the SSLDispatchingService, which, as the name suggests,
provides the SSL service.
If a client wants to open a secure connection, it must create a SSLDis-
patchingService object, and it must specify the url of the broker to which
it wants to connect. In particular, it must present a certificate, that in the
specific case is provided from command line (following the standard specifi-
cations of the JVM).
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In a REDS environment, a subscriber sends to the ENS particular mes-
sages, called filters. A filter is a message sent by a subscriber that specifies
to which type of messages it wants to subscribe. Thus clients are classified
on the basis of their filters. The standard REDS architecture provides a
generic interface, called Filter , that can be implemented according to the
specific needs. REDS provides a TextFilter and a PTreeFilter. In the new
architecture a new Filter is added, the XACMLFilter, that is checked by the
Access Control Strategy of every broker. The interface Filter and its imple-
mentations is showed in the Figure 4.1. The XACMLFilter takes as input an
Authorization Certificate, that is made of the tuple (subject,action,resource).
This tuple is submitted to the XACML system of every broker through the
Access Control Strategy.
In a REDS environment, a publisher sends to the ENS messages, each
of them having a specific topic. The interface Message represents this con-
cept, and the REDS architecture provides two implementations of it, the
TextMessage and the PTreeMessage. Note the duality with the Filter imple-
mentations. In the new architecture, a new implementation is provided, the
XACMLMessage, which is submitted to access control. The Message inter-
face and its implementations are showed in the Figure 4.2. As the XACML-
Filter, also the XACMLMessage takes as input an Authorizations Certificate,
that contains the tuple (subject,action,resource), which determines who is
the publisher, which action it wants to execute and which is the resource it
wants to publish. Thus the resource is the topic of the message. Indeed,
an XACMLMessage can have also a content, that can be specified using the
method setContent(). If a publisher wants to establish a private access con-
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<<interface>>
Filter
XACMLFilter
TextFilter
PTreeFilter
Figure 4.1: The Filter.
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<<interface>>
Message
XACMLMessage
TextMessage
PTreeMessage
Figure 4.2: The Message.
trol policy on its message, it can invoke the method setRule(), that allows it
to establish which subscribers can receive its messages.
4.2 The SecurityManager
As discussed in the last chapter, the Security Manager is the main com-
ponent of the new architecture. The security extension of REDS provides
a generic interface called SecurityManager, and a specific implementation,
the GenericSecurityManager. This is shown in the Figure 4.7. In order to
support the security test, two components are implemented: the Trust and
the ConnectionPolicy. The former, as described previously, specifies whether
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<<interface>>
Router
GenericRouter SecureRouter
Figure 4.3: The Router. The Router interface is implemented by the Gener-
icRouter (provided by REDS), which provides the basic services, and by the
SecureRouter (extended by the new architecture), which provides security
guarantees.
<<interface>>
Overlay
GenericOverlay SecureOverlay
Figure 4.4: The Overlay. The Overlay interface is implemented by the
GenericOverlay (provided by REDS), which provides the basic services, and
by the SecureOverlay (extended by the new architecture), which provides
security guarantees. The figure doesn’t show the sub-components of the
overlay layer, like the TopologyManager.
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<<interface>>
Transport
+openLink(in url:String,out nodeDescriptor:NodeDescriptor)
+closeLink(in closedNeighbor:NodeDescriptor)
+addLinkOpenedListener(in listener:LinkOpenedListener)
+linkClosedListener(in listener:LinkClosedListener)
+addLinkDeadListener(in listener:LinkDeadListener)
+send(in subject:String,in payload:Serializable,
      in receiver:NodeDescriptor)
+sendAll(subject:String,in payload:Serializable)
+sendAllExcept(in subject:String,in payload:Serializable,
               in excluded:NodeDescriptor)
+addPacketListener(in listener:PacketListener)
+start()
+stop()
+getURL(out url:String)
+setBeaconing(in b:boolean)
+isBeaconing(out flag:boolean)
+setNodeDescriptor(in nodeDescriptor:NodeDescriptor)
+getNodeDescriptor(out nodeDescriptor:NodeDescriptor)
TCPUDP
<<interface>>
SecureTransport
+addSecureLinkOpenedListener(in listener:SecureLinkOpenedListener)
+setSecurityManager(in securityManager:SecurityManager)
+getSecurityManager(out securityManager:SecurityManager)
+getPacketListeners(out packetListeners:Map)
SSL
ComplexTransport
+openSecureLink(in url:String,out nodeDescriptor:NodeDescriptor)
+closeSecureLink(in closedNeighbor:NodeDescriptor)
+addSecureLinkOpenedListener(in listener:SecureLinkOpenedListener)
+secureSend(in subject:String,in payload:Serializable,
            in receiver:NodeDescriptor)
+secureSendAll(in subject:String,in payload:Serializable)
+secureSendAllExcept(in subject:String,in payload:Serializable,
                     in excluded:NodeDescriptor)
+getTransport(out transport:Transport)
+getSecureTransport(out secureTransport:SecureTransport)
Figure 4.5: The Transport. To the standard Transports (UDP and TCP),
the SSL transport is added. It’s a SecureTransport. The last defines an
interface that in the future could be extended by another type of protocol.
The figure shows also The ComplexTransport component, which contains a
Transport and a SecureTransport object. It’s used to manage both standard
and secure connections.
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<<interface>>
DispatchingService
+open()
+close()
+getID(out nodeDescriptor:NodeDescriptor)
+getNextMessage(out message:Message)
+getNextMessage(in timeout:long,out message:Message)
+getNextMessage(in filter:Filter,out message:Message)
+hasMoreMessages(out flag:boolean)
+hasMoreMessages(in filter:Filter,out flag:boolean)
+subscribe(in filter:Filter)
+unsubscribe(in filter:Filter)
+unsubscribeAll()
+publish(in message:Message)
+isOpened(out flag:boolean)
+reply(in message:Message,in messageID:MessageID)
+getNextReply(in messageID:MessageID)
+getNextReply()
+getNextReply(in timeout:long,out message:Message)
+hasMoreReplies(out flag:boolean)
+hasMoreReplies(in messageID:MessageID,out flag:boolean)
+getAllReplies(in messageID:MessageID,out replies:Replies)
TCPDispatchingService UDPDispatchingService SSLDispatchingService
Figure 4.6: The DispatchingService. It’s the client API. To the old ar-
chitecture, the SSLDispatchingService component is added (in pink), which
allows the client to open and communicate over a secure link.
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a certificate presented by a neighbor can be considered trusted or not. In
our specific distribution of SEC-REDS, two strategies exist:
• the SubjectBasedTrust, according to which the broker stores the list of
characteristics that the certificate must have. In the specific case, the
only characteristic is the subject, and
• the CertificateBasedTrust, in which the broker stores the list of valid
certificates.
Figure 4.8 shows it.
If the certificate presented by the neighbor is not valid, the local con-
nection policy is applied. Our specific implementation provides two types of
connection policy:
• BrutalCloseConnectionPolicy, in which the connection is closed, with-
out sending a message to the rejected client, and
• UntrustedDegradeConnectionPolicy, which degrades the neighbor to
untrusted.
Figure 4.9 explains it.
To manage the access control , a new component is developed, the Ac-
cessControlStrategy , which directly interacts with the SecurityManager. As
example, a generic AccessControlStrategy is realized, that, simply, applies
the policy to messages/filters. The policy is stored into a configuration file.
Figure 4.10 shows this component.
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<<interface>>
SecurityManager
+setOverlay(in overlay:SecureOverlay)
+getOverlay(out overlay:SecureOverlay)
+getID(out nodeDescriptor:NodeDescriptor)
+isTrusted(in nodeDescrptor:NodeDescriptor,
           out flag:boolean)
+isTrusted(in certificate:Certificate,out flagq:boolean)
+setTrust(in t:Trust)
+getTrust(out t:Trust)
+setConnectionPolicy(in cp:ConnectionPolicy)
+getConnectionPolicy(out cp:ConnectionPolicy)
+applyPolicy(in obj:Object)
+addDegradedNeighbor(in neighbor:NodeDescriptor)
+removeDegradedNeighbor(in neighbor:NodeDescriptor)
+isDegraded(in nodeDescriptor:NodeDescriptor,
            out flag:boolean)
+setAccessControlStrategy(in acs:AccessControlStrategy)
+getAccessControlStrategy(out acs:AccessControlStrategy)
+evaluate(in obj:Object,out flag:boolean)
+addRuleToPolicy(in rule:String)
+floodRule(in rule:String,in except:NodeDescriptor)
+getRuleSet(out ruleSet:Set)
+addRejectedClient(in object:Object)
+checkRejectedClients()
GenericSecurityManager
Figure 4.7: The SecurityManager. The SecurityManager is the central
component of the new architecture. It interacts with the Trust, Connec-
tionPolicy and AccessControlStrategy objects, so it manages all the security
aspects. The new architecture without the SecurityManager is like a sea
without water.
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<<interface>>
Trust
+isTrusted(in certificate:Certificate,out flag:boolean)
+addAccepted(in obj:Object)
+removeAccepted(in obj:Object)
+getAccepted(out objectsList:Object[])
SubjectBasedTrust CertificateBasedTrust
Figure 4.8: The Trust. This component interacts with the SecurityManager
and establishes if a neighbor can be considered trusted. In the actual version
of our implementation two strategies of trustworthiness are provided. These
are shown in the figure.
<<interface>>
ConnectionPolicy
+applyPolicy(in obj:Object)
+addDegradedNeighbor(in neighbor:NodeDescriptor)
+removeDegradedNeighbor(in neighbor:NodeDescriptor)
+containsNeighbor(in nodeDescriptor:NodeDescriptor)
BrutalCloseConnectionPolicy UntrustedDegradeConnectionPolicy
Figure 4.9: The ConnectionPolicy. This component interacts with the
SecurityManager and establishes what strategy must be adopted if a neighbor
can’t be considered trusted. In the actual version of our implementation two
strategies of trustworthiness are provided. These are shown in the figure.
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AccessControlStrategy
+evaluate(in object:Object,out flag:boolean)
+addRuleToPolicy(in rule:String)
+updatePDP()
+getRuleSet(out ruleSet:Set)
AbstractAccessControlStrategy
+setupSubjects(in subject:String,in group:String,
               out subjects:Set): static
+setupResource(in resource:String,out resources:Set)
+setupAction(in actionType:String,out action:Set)
GenericAccessControlStrategy
Figure 4.10: The AccessControlStrategy. This component interacts with
the SecurityManager and manages all the access control. To the basic inter-
face, an abstract class is added, the AbstractAccessControlStrategy, which
defines basic operations, like building a subject, a resource, or an action.
Then a GenericAccessControlStrategy is realized.
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<<interface>>
BackupConnectionsManager
+addBackupConnection(in n:NodeDescriptor,
                     in p:Proxy)
+removeBackupConnection(in n:NodeDescriptor,
                        in p:Proxy)
+getPreferredBackupConnection(in n:NodeDescriptor,
                              out p:Proxy)
+removePreferredBackupConnection(in n:NodeDescriptor)
+hasBackupConnections(in n:NodeDescriptor,
                      out b:boolean)
+removeBackupConnections(n:NodeDescriptor)
+getBackupConnections(in n:NodeDescriptor,
                      out l:List)
+addNeighbor(in n:NodeDescriptor)
+removeNeighbor(in n:NodeDescriptor)
+contains(in n:NodeDescriptor,out b:boolean)
+addTransport(in t:Transport)
+removeTransport(in t:Transport)
+contains(in t:Transport,out b:boolean)
+updateTransport(in p:Proxy)
+getAllBackupConnectionIDs(in n:NodeDescriptor,
                           out l:List)
ActiveBackupConnectionsManager OnDemandBackupConnectionsManager
Figure 4.11: The BackupConnectionsManager.
4.3 The Backup Connections Manager
In order to support redundancy another component is added, that is the
BackupConnectionManager, which works at the Transport layers and man-
ages all the backup connections. It is shown in the Figure 4.11.
The actual version of SEC-REDS provides two implementations of the
BackupConnectionsManager, the ActiveBackupConnectionsManager and the
OnDemandBackupConnectionsManager. Those have been explained in the
previous chapter.
Appendix A
A brief description of XACML
Tutto cio` che puo` essere detto, puo` essere detto
chiaramente.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 - 1951)
Austrian philosopher
A.1 The architecture
XACML [24] defines a general policy language used to protect resources
as well as an access decision language.
Every enterprise has a need to secure resources accessed by employees,
partners, and customers. For example, browser based access to portals which
aggregate resources (web pages, applications, services, etc.) are typical in to-
day’s enterprises. Clients send requests to servers for resources, but before a
server can return that resource it must determine if the requester is autho-
rized to use the resource. This is where XACML fits in. XACML provides
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a policy language which allows administrators to define the access control
requirements for their application resources. The language and schema sup-
port include data types, functions, and combining logic which allow complex
(or simple) rules to be defined. XACML also includes an access decision
language used to represent the runtime request for a resource. When a pol-
icy is located which protects a resource, functions compare attributes in the
request against attributes contained in the policy rules ultimately yielding a
permit or deny decision.
Let consider the Figure A.1, that shows the evaluation process of a request
sent by a client. The client sends a request (1) made of a tuple composed by a
subject, a resource and an action. The subject identifies the originator of the
request (e.g. John Smith), the resource represents the object that the subject
wants to access (e.g. a file on a server), and the action specifies what the
subject wants to do with that resource (e.g. download that file). The request
is sent to the Server Policy Enforcement Point or simply Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP, for short), which is the system entity that performs access con-
trol, by making decision requests and enforcing authorization decisions. The
PEP sends the request to the Policy Information Point (PIP) (2), which is
the system entity that takes from the received tuple the list of attributes.
In fact, each member of the tuple (subject,resource,action) can have one or
more attributes, characterizing that specific member. An attribute is made
of predicates, that are statements about attributes whose truth can be eval-
uated. Then the PIP sends to the PEP the list of the obtained attributes.
The PEP sends the request made of the tuple (subject,resource,action) and
its attributes to the Policy Decision Point (PDP) (3), that is the system en-
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Policy Decision
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resource,action)
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Point
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Environment Attributes
XACML
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Requestor attributes
Policy Store
XACML
User
Figure A.1: XACML Architecture
tity that evaluates applicable policy and renders an authorization decision,
which is the result of evaluating applicable policy. In particular, it consults
the Policy Store (4), that maintains the access control policy and then it
establishes whether the request can be accepted or not. The result of the
decision can be Permit or Deny. Finally, it sends the result to the PEP (5),
which communicates it to the user (6).
The XACML architecture is complete so an administrator can install it
on its server. The only thing he must specify is the access control policy,
which obviously may vary from a system to another.
An administrator creates policies in the XACML language. XACML
defines three top-level policy elements: <Rule>, <Policy> and <PolicySet>.
The <Rule> element contains a boolean expression that can be evaluated in
isolation, but that is not intended to be accessed in isolation by a PDP.
In particular, it is evaluated in a policy. A <Rule> is composed by three
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fundamental elements, the <Subject>,the <Resource> and the <Action>.
Through those elements, you can specify to which the rule must be applied.
The rule has an effect, that is Permit or Deny.
The <Policy> element contains a set of <Rule> elements and a specified
procedure for combining the results of their evaluation. In fact, more rules
could result applicable to the same tuple (subject,resource,action). In this
case, the procedure for combining the result specifies which rule must be
applied. The procedure could be first applicable (the first rule found in the
list is applied) or permit overrides (if a rule whose result is Permit is found, it
is applied, independently from the other results). The <Policy> is the basic
unit of policy used by the PDP, and so it is intended to form the basis of an
authorization decision. A <Policy> can have also a <Target>, that specifies
the set of requests, a policy is intended to evaluate. A <Target> is made
of by three fundamental elements, the <Subject>, the <Resource> and the
<Action>. Thus a policy using the target concept can establish a first level of
visibility. In fact, among all the requests, only those matching with the target
are further analyzed by that policy. Then, if among all the rules making the
policy, at least one is found, a standard result (Permit or Deny) is provided,
but if no rule is found, the result is Not Applicable. The <PolicySet> element
contains a set of <Policy> or other <PolicySet> elements and a specified
procedure for combining the results of their evaluation. It is the standard
means for combining separate policies into a single combined policy.
If a client wants to build a request, he must create a request. This can
be achieved using the XACML language. He creates a <Request> element,
in which he can simply specify the tuple (subject, resource, action).
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A.2 A simple example
Let consider the following example, in which a client tries to access to
the server Sample Server. The action it wants to perform is of login. The
XACML request is the following:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<Request>
<Resource>
<Attribute
AttributeId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:
resource:resource-id"
DataType=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
<AttributeValue>Sample Server</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Resource>
<Action>
<Attribute
AttributeId="Server Action"
DataType=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
<AttributeValue>login</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Action>
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</Request>
The previous example specifies that a generic client wants to access the
resource Simple Server to execute the action of login. In particular, both
for the resource and the action he specifies attributes, characterized by an
attribute value and an attribute id. Let suppose now that the server policy
is the following:
<Policy PolicyId="SamplePolicy"
RuleCombiningAlgId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:
rule-combining-algorithm:first-applicable">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<AnySubject/>
</Subjects>
<Resources>
<Resource>
<ResourceMatch
MatchId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:
function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue
DataType=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
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SampleServer
</AttributeValue>
<ResourceAttributeDesignator
DataType=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
AttributeId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:
resource:resource-id"/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource>
</Resources>
<Actions>
<AnyAction/>
</Actions>
</Target>
<Rule
RuleId="LoginRule" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<AnySubject/>
</Subjects>
<Resources>
<AnyResource/>
</Resources>
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<Actions>
<Action>
<ActionMatch
MatchId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:
function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue
DataType=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
login
</AttributeValue>
<ActionAttributeDesignator
DataType=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string
AttributeId="Server Action"/>
</ActionMatch>
</Action>
</Actions>
</Target>
</Rule>
<Rule RuleId="FinalRule" Effect="Deny" />
</Policy>
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As we can see from the code, this policy applies only to clients that want
to access to Sample Server. The first rule establishes that a client that wants
to login to the server, can perform this action, while the second rule is applied
to all the other clients, that want to perform other actions. In this case, they
can’t do them.
When the client sends the request to the server, this evaluates it and
produces the result:
<Response>
<Result>
<Decision>Permit</Decision>
<Status>
<StatusCode Value=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:
1.0:status:ok" />
</Status>
</Result>
>/Response>
As expected, the server allows the client to login.
Appendix B
A simple case of study
Example is the school of mankind, and they will
learn at no other.
Edmund Burk (1729 - 1797)
Irish philosopher
Let suppose that a patient wants to send his data to his physician and let
suppose that he suffers of angina pectoris. Periodically, he sends his healthy
conditions to his physician. But let suppose also that all the cardiologists
wants to collect information about angina pectoris, without knowing the
patient identity. An access control strategy can be used.
The patient, here named John Patient, can act as a publisher so he can
define the following code:
KeyStoreData ksd = new KeyStoreData();
ksd.setKeystore("Patient","JKS","123456".toCharArray());
ksd.setRecord("patient","123456".toCharArray());
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ksd.setSignature(null,"MD5withRSA");
XACMLMessage message = new XACMLMessage("John Patient",
null,"angina pectoris","publish",ksd);
String[] data = new String[3];
data[0] = "Name:John,Surname:Patient,born:4/2/1948,
country:Italy";
data[1] = "type of illness:steady angina";
data[2] = "number of pills in a day: if needed,
type of pill:Carvasin 10mg";
MessageContent mc = new MessageContent(data);
int[] cVis = {0};
mc.addMember("Andrew Smith", null);
mc.addMember("cardiologists",cVis);
message.setMessageContent(mc);
message.setRule("AllowAllCardiologists",
null,"angina pectoris" ,
"subscribe","cardiologists", "Permit");
DispatchingService es =
new SSLDispatchingService(dsAddr, dsPort);
es.open() throws Exception;
es.publish(message);
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John Patient must present to the dispatching network an Authorizations
Certificate. This certificate is recovered from his local Key Store (a Java
Object in which local certificates are stored). In particular, he creates a
KeyStoreData object, that contains all the data necessary to recover the
Authorizations Certificate from the key store. the which in this case al-
lows him to publish his publications. Then he creates a XACMLMessage, in
which he specifies the asked operations (S,R,A) and the Authorizations Cer-
tificate (which will be recovered directly from the local key store). Then
he create a MessageContent object, which contains the content of the mes-
sage (in the example, he suffers of a type of angina, called steady angina
and he must take a pill, named Carvasin 10mg only if needed) and the
table of visibility. To add a member to that table, he uses the method
addMember(String member, int[] visibility), in which the vector vis-
ibility specifies the fields of the message content seen by that member. If
it is null, all fields are available. Then he sets a rule for the message: he
allows all the cardiologists to subscribe to his message. Finally he creates a
SSLDispatchingService object and publishes the message.
Note that all cardiologists will receive the message, but with different
visibilities. In fact, Andrew Smith will receive all the information, while a
generic cardiologist only those about healthy conditions.
A generic cardiologists wanting to receive these informations, must present
to the dispatching network a valid AuthorizationsCertificate, that classi-
fies him as belonging to the cardiologists group. Then, he simply subscribes.
DispatchingService es =
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new SSLDispatchingService(dsAddr, dsPort);
es.open();
KeyStoreData ksd = new KeyStoreData();
ksd.setKeystore("Cardiologist","JKS","123456".toCharArray());
ksd.setRecord("cardiologist","123456".toCharArray());
ksd.setSignature(null,"MD5withRSA");
es.subscribe(new XACMLFilter("Mark Cardiologist",
"cardiologists","angina pectoris","subscribe", ksd));
XACMLMessage m = (XACMLMessage)es.getNextMessage();
If the cardiologist is Andrew Physician he will receive the whole informa-
tion.
Appendix C
Setting up a secure and robust
broker
If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end
in doubt; but if he will be content to begin with
doubts, he shall end in certainties.
Francis Bacon (1561 - 1626)
English philosopher
This appendix explains how a secure and robust broker could be built
up. Note that in this context the term object and the term component have
the same meaning. Firstly, the Overlay level is built up, setting up the
Transport:
int TCPport = 8080;
int SSLport = 8081;
Transport normalTransport = new TCPTransport(TCPport);
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SecureTransport secureTransprt = new SSLTransport(SSLport);
ComplexTransport transport =
new ComplexTransport(normalTransport,secureTransport);
In the example, two Transport are created, the TCPTransport, which
listens at the port 8080, and the SSLTransport, which listens at the port
8081. Than the two Transport objects are joined using a ComplexTransport
object, which manages them.
As next step, the TopologyManager component is created.
SecureTopologyManager topolMgr = new
SecureLSTreeTopologyManager(transport);
In the example, a SecureLSTreeTopologyManager is created, passing the
Transport as parameter. This specific TopologyManager is an extension in
terms of security of the LSTreeTopologyManager provided by the standard
REDS architecture.
Now the overlay components are created, so the Overlay object can be
created.
SecureOverlay overlay =
new SecureOverlay(topolMgr,transport);
The example shows the creation of a SecureOverlay object, that is an
extension in terms of security of the Overlay provided by the standard REDS
architecture.
After having created the Overlay level, the SecurityManager and the
BackupConnectionsManager can be created.
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SecurityManager secMgr =
new GenericSecurityManager(overlay);
BackupConnectionsManager bcm = new
OnDemandBackupConnectionsManager(secMgr);
transport.setBackupConnectionsManager(bcm);
The example employs a OnDemandBackupConnectionsManager. Then the
Routing layer can be built up.
SecureRoutingStrategy routingStrategy = new
SecureSubscriptionForwardingRoutingStrategy();
Reconfigurator reconf =
new DeferredUnsubscriptionReconfigurator();
SubscriptionTable subscriptionTable =
new GenericTable();
SecureReplyManager replyMgr = new
SecureImmediateForwardReplyManager();
ReplyTable replyTbl = new HashReplyTable();
SecureRouter router =
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new SecureRouter(secMgr,overlay);
The RoutingStrategy is created. The example shows the creation of
a SecureSubscriptionForwardingRoutingStrategy, that is an extension
in terms of security of the SubscriptionForwardingRoutingStrategy pro-
vided by the standard REDS architecture. Then the Reconfigurator object
is built up, using the DeferredUnsubscriptionReconfigurator, implemen-
tation. Then the SubscriptionTable is created, using the GenericTable
implementation. Also the ReplyManager and the ReplyTable are created.
Note that the SecureReplyManager is an extension in terms of security of
the ReplyManager provided by the standard REDS architecture. Finally the
Router is created. The example shows the creation of a SecureRouter ob-
ject, that is an extension in terms of security of the Router provided by the
standard REDS architecture.
All those components must be joined, with the following strategy:
secureTransport.setSecurityManager(secMgr);
routingStrategy.setSecurityManager(secMgr);
routingStrategy.setOverlay(overlay);
reconf.setOverlay(overlay);
reconf.setRouter(router);
replyMgr.setReplyTable(replyTbl);
replyMgr.setSecurityManager(secMgr);
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router.setSubscriptionTable(subscriptionTable);
router.setRoutingStrategy(routingStrategy);
router.setReplyManager(replyMgr);
router.setReplyTable(replyTbl);
As next step, all the security components (excluded the SecurityManager
already defined) must be created.
Trust trust = new SubjectBasedTrust();
trust.addAccepted("John Patient");
The Trust object is created, using the SubjectBasedTrust implementa-
tion, in which you can specify the list of accepted subjects. In the example
all the certificates in which John Patient is the subject, are considered as
trusted. Then the ConnectionPolicy object is created.
ConnectionPolicy cp =
new UntrustedDegradeConnectionPolicy();
The example shows the use of the UntrustedDegradeConnectionPolicy,
in which a neighbor is degraded to untrusted, if its certificate is not considered
valid by the Trust object.
Eventually the ConnectionPolicy and the Trust components are joined
to the SecurityManager:
secMgr.setTrust(trust);
secMgr.setConnectionPolicy(cp);
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If you want to link a broker towards another broker, you simply invoke
the following method:
String url = "reds-ssl:127.0.0.1:8081";
overlay.addNeighbor(url);
In this case, the broker tries to open a ssl connection towards the neighbor
whose url is specified by the string url.
If you want to add a backup connection, you can invoke the following
methods:
String defaultURL = "reds-ssl:155.34.10.3:8081";
BackupStrategy bs =
new BackupStrategy(defaultURL,neighbor);
bs.setTimeout(10000);
bs.setTentatives(2);
String backupURL = "reds-tcp:155.34.10.3:8080";
bs.addBackupConnection(backupURL);
bcm.addMasterBackupConnection(bs);
Firstly, the BackupStrategy is created, in which the default url and the
neighbor are specified. The example shows that the timeout is 10 sec. and
the number of tentatives 2. A backup connection is added, that is speci-
fied by the string backup url. Finally, the BackupStrategy is added to the
BackupConnectionsManager.
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